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Fact to be perceived on both sides as unstable in a crisis, not just an ordinary crisis, but a crisis that has gotten very high. The basic threat can be described this way: "thanks to the weapons ~~XXXXXX~~ I've built, and the weapons you've built, you can't be sure, you must fear, that if a two-sided conflict between our forces, and in particular a two-sided nuclear conflict, ^{occurs} however low a level, one or the other of us may choose to ~~XXXXXX~~ ^{strike} first. Maybe you will, maybe I will. The situation has become unstable and you made it unstable and I made it unstable. I hope that you will not, therefore, the kind of crisis arise which would provide the kind of displacement that would trigger that instability." An analogy might be that I made the game into a ~~HOUSE OF CARDS~~ game of a house of cards where, after a certain level of cards, I'm saying the stakes for me in this confrontation are so great, (unlike yours as I perceive, ^{now} that I'm going to put another card on, and I'm going to do so with the trust that you will not put another card on, (although you have plenty of cards to put on) because the risk is too great that the house will come down. If you do put another card on, I'll put another card on, (though that's a bluff. I hope it doesn't go that far. I can see that this thing might last, might hold one more card. ^{if} Sure as hell can't hold two more cards and I hope you won't put the second card on.) But that's the game is played. ^{Now,} What kind of weapons will that lead to if that's what ^{one were?} we're doing. It would lead to weapons which ^{were} would both disarm, ⁱⁿ in the sense of ability to disarm your opponent to some degree, and vulnerable. If they weren't vulnerable, they would not contribute to the instability. At least not as much, and I notice -

Q: You want ^{to be able to disarm} to the ~~XX~~ other side. ^{But} There's no motivation for you to want to have ^{weapons that are} that vulnerable.

D.H.: No, that's wrong. Supposing we acquired nothing but Trident-D5 missiles. These are to go on Trident Missiles, they are first-~~fight~~ ^{strike} warheads which won't come until late 80s, but we're building them now. Supposing we were building nothing

but Trident missiles and ^{we} you got rid of everything else. They are all in submarines. As I said before, Trident D-5 missiles which by the way can have a very short delivery time, like Pershings, they can come up close as well as being very accurate (they are suppose to be as accurate as MX - within a hundred ~~XXXXX~~ yards - so we can hit Russian missiles) but it gets 1,400 Russian missiles. They arn't in fact ^{going to - the} ~~for disarm~~ ^{the} ~~XXXXX~~ Russians to that degree. In paper they will, but in practice they won't. If all you had were Trident D-5 which can't be hit at all by the Soviet side

It is considered...
You can't make a threat

Q. It doesn't mean that everyone of your warheads has to be vulnerable, but it means you have to have some vulnerable *components*

Q. Why?

Because unless the Soviets have an incentive to try to disarm you in a crisis, unless they have ^a ~~the~~ capability to do it, it's hard to claim that if things get ^{that} to the pass, I may fear that you ^{will} ~~may~~ strike me. You can't make the credible ^{threat.} ~~trap.~~ You can still have your disarming capability for insurance, in case ^{it is} ~~the~~ best you could do, but you couldn't say beforehand, "I'll use the B-5 in this situation" because the Russians would say, "why [?] we have a hundred warheads left, we'll destroy you; a hundred missiles left." (They can't say - we'd say, "well, you might hit us." "What would we hit? Why would we hit you?"

Credible fears

In other words, let me say I fit this to the data and I noticed the following:

Having talked about a window of vulnerability, which on paper does exist right now, thanks to the Soviet SS^{-18's} ~~beams~~ against our entire Minuteman force now.

That having been the campaign ^{on} ~~under~~ which Reagan ran, ^{just as} Kennedy ran on the missile

^{90%} in 1960. I notice ^a ~~the~~ programs for five years of spending with a trillion and a half dollars, which the Pentagon secret studies show would be 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ trillion dollars over five years, 50% higher. I can find not one dollar

in that budget that reduces the window of vulnerability. What I do find is

280 billion, which is to say 400 billion in reality, of strategic spending

which is directed ^{to} ~~for~~ one thing only - opening a window of vulnerability

on the Soviet side, which, by your point, doesn't reduce the danger of being

attacked; it increases the danger of ^{being} ~~attack~~. So if our only concern, as is

sometimes suggested, is to reduce the likelihood ^{of a Soviet} ~~attack~~ on this country (which is

what Reagan is talking about) those guys are crazy. They are going exactly in

the wrong direction. They are buying stuff that is vulnerable - it doesn't reduce

the window of vulnerability, with the exception of the D-5 which is the longest-

term thing, every weapon he is buying is both counterforce and vulnerable.

I'm talking about the neutron bomb at the first-use level, the ^{Cruise} ~~Cruise~~ missile,

the ~~Pershing Missile~~, the Pershing II Missile, the MX. Everyone of those, with

perhaps the exception of ^{B-1} ~~B-1~~, everyone ^{of} ~~is~~ those is a vulnerable first-strike weapon

and makes ^{our} ~~a~~ ^{once} ~~detrant~~ of nuclear attack less. ^{Is this} ~~XXXX~~ worse? Is this ^{sheer madness?} ~~madness?~~

Or does it mean that the weapons, as in the past, are being bought for some purpose

other than the deterrence of nuclear attack, and potentially at odds with the

deterrence of nuclear attack? The effect is at odds, for sure. Let me suggest

it would only in accordance with all past experience and many things ^{that the} ~~at the rate~~

^{Reagan administration says to} ~~in which they should say to~~ infer that, as in the past, they are buying nuclear

weapons for purposes in addition, ⁱⁿ ~~and~~ at odds with, deterring nuclear attack on this

country. Those purposes are to improve the safety and credibility of our inter-

ventionary forces by improving the credibility that we will back up those forces

with nuclear weapons if necessary, and the the credibility ^{which is in fact}

pretty much a bluff that we would even escalate ~~MX~~ if the Soviets retaliated to the use of those nuclear weapons. The threat being that we will have bought weapons - by the way, there were clear alternatives to this. ^{Inf} Reagan wanted in the short run to reduce the window ^{of} vulnerability, ^{There} were many programs that eliminated or reduced that window of vulnerability. Many ways to reduce the vulnerability of our retaliatory force. He's not spending a dime on any of them.) One thing ^{is} to say, then, ^{his} ~~he~~ priority ~~are otherwise~~, ^{and} that's part of it. I think the other part of it that he doesn't mind the vulnerability and the Pershing is ~~more~~ vulnerable ~~than MX~~ because it more credible when it is vulnerable. The MX is put in Minuteman Silos. That what they want to do. It is cheaper and doing its main function, which is ^{a first} strike function in silos, ^{let me add one more point.} and then you add. It's a more credible weapon in a silo than it would be at sea. It does the job better than it would do otherwise. Keep in mind that can only do so well. The threat, the function is a threat function, and that threat function is better performed in a Minuteman silo, and that's where the joint chiefs ^{agree} intend to put it.

I see that we have two choices.

That's a theory.

Q: We could either use huge bombs and just ^{Kill tons} ~~kill hundreds~~ of people ^(quickness) ~~occasionally not~~ ^{important} ~~we do not~~ - we don't need great accuracy to kill a lot of people, at war because ^{we don't need to worry about a big nuclear war. Then the other} you can't make those ~~we threat more~~ credible. On the other hand we won't be able to ^{do} intervention ^{around the world.} in war. Or, we can ^{have the risk of} ~~construction~~ because people may go through ^{a first} strike, but gain from that risk if ^{destruction}

Yes, I understand. I think this strategy is related, in ways that I can recognize in the past. It is related to the protection ^{our} ~~XXXXXX~~ of an interventionary capability and I can think of no other way, and nobody else has published

any other, to do it, so maybe the only way to do it. The alternative to this is maybe give up some of the intervention. But to get back to your point, can the thing simply be eliminated by going on launch on ~~one~~ ^{warning}. The answer to that is this. It cannot be made 100% credible if you have gone on L-O-W because it's ~~so~~ dangerous to go on launch on ~~one~~ ^{warning} especially day in and day out. If you go on in it in a crisis, ~~because~~ it's especially dangerous in a crisis ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ because that's ^{just} when an ~~actual~~ indication on your radar is likely to be interpreted as an actual attack. So launch on ~~one~~ ^{warning} is a dangerous policy.

Q: Dick Garwin's Darwin's version bargaining You were talking about ^{whether you} ~~not doing~~ it, but how do you do it for strategy. You could use a scenario in which you would ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ go on the hot line and say [?] That strikes me as an option that would be there.

D.E.- To see if my model is working since we are proposing to put Pershing in, we should ask, "What do we predict the Russians will do?" Well, I have inside information ~~NEW~~ from the headlines of the San Francisco Chronicle. What the Russians ^{have} said they would ^{is} to go on launch on ~~one~~ ^{warning}. That's the appropriate answer to it. It doesn't wipe out the Pershing because as I say, ~~if~~ we can still say we don't believe that, ^A and second, if you do it - we don't believe you'd be so crazy ^{to} do it other than a major crisis. Don't let such a crisis occur. Your ^{own} launch on ~~one~~ ^{warning} is part of our threat structure. Basically, the threat is one of instability. It doesn't matter too much which side contributes to the instability.

Joe Nye

Q- There are two dimensions to your model. I think what you said was true. ^{what you are talking about is the credibility of extension of terrorism (?)} That- terrorists. Extension of ^{in the} third world and Europe.

It has Been around for a long time, But there are two mechanisms on which it works. One is the credibility of the ^{threat of no levels of} escalation, and for years that was always known as ^{dominance} the escalation ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and you lose that, in the 70's, as you say; and then

you can do either two things. You can go to the Harold Brown escalation ^{matching, in an ambiguous sense or - 59,} ~~vacuum~~ or you can do what these people do - try to recapture escalating ¹⁰⁰ dominance dominance ~~dominance~~. And Paul Nitze would tell you that - he would ~~say~~ You'll say exactly what you said.

Nothing has surprised me. I think what you said is correct, Paul Nitze were here he would say exactly the same thing.

That's what I assume, but I'm glad to have ~~you~~ say it.

He wouldn't dispute you on that. But I think it's a pretty ^{can} The thing that's interesting, I don't think they'd do it - that they ~~can~~ ^{can} regain dominance escalation ~~dominance~~ I don't think that's achievable.

What did he say? Would he say that they are trying to gain escalation dominance? What ~~they~~ ^{he} say publically is that they ^{just} are trying to keep the Soviets from having escalation dominance.

His argument is the following. Suppose you have a situation in the Persian Gulf where getting some troops there quickly ^{may} hold the difference. Would you do that or not? He said, no, because as you walk the ladder it will be dominated by people doing the calculation of what if, what if. When you ~~reach the top~~ ^{they see that at} ~~see~~ the top of the ladder, you don't have control of the escalation. You are deterred. ^{So essentially,} He said if you're ^{beat on the board,} and get out. The only way you can have credibility for that ^{expeditionary force} escalation is to make sure you have credibility ¹³³¹ (all the way up the ladder)?

But does he say - here's what I'm asking. I'm very interested in this. Up until basically '75, I've tracked his public statements carefully ^[Nye: I've only heard him say this privately] All of his writings up until he went public, ^{with Comm. for the Present Danger} all but his relatively private writings; all said superiority, is indispensable. In '76 and '77 he began saying, and has continued to say, superiority is of course impossible to achieve and not really our objective. What we really ^{want} ~~what~~ is to avoid Soviet superiority. I could explain that as just being his way of selling the program, or it could be that he realistically

rather than admit what he wanted, superiority.

does feel that ^{it} is no longer ^{really} achievable and he wants to avoid Soviet superiority.
Do you happen to know?

Nyc: That's a particular formulation (incredible) that all you need is to match.

Not all you need; all you can get, ^{and all he's achieving.} That's what the Committee for Present Danger says, over and over. He definitely said that in writing.

The conversation I remember was the one about ~~you don't~~....

D.E.: Do you remember what year that was?

Nyc: ^{At the} 1979 or 1980. Time of P.D. 59.

D.E.: Let me add two wrinkles to this. Three wrinkles. One, they do have ^{one weapon} which suggests ^{at} ~~that~~ one level - escalation dominance - it's not at the highest level which would be desirable. ^{But in a way, it's almost more important.} The Pershing is a weapon for escalation which, if it works as scheduled and when it's scheduled, will be the first weapon on either side that will in fact be a rather credible escalation for the following reasons. ^{weapon} On the one hand it is vulnerable, ^{which helps} use it before you lose it, at least in the Middle East... Say there is a war in ~~THE MIDDLE EAST~~ Iran - they have matched us on nuclear weapons and you say, ^{your target is struck.} if you match us with nuclear weapons, you're going to get ^{it} - you can't do that." The Pershing gives you a unique capability which neither side possesses now and only we will possess if we have it. To hit military targets in the vicinity of Iran, the whole ^{logistics} line, ^{command/} division headquarters, ~~unit~~ control, transportation, with sufficient accuracy, that it can destroy those targets with very small warheads, perhaps 1 kiloton or 2 kiloton warheads. Those warheads are as small as they have to be. Any warhead larger than that will not do, to avoid Soviet towns in the vicinity of those

targets. It will be the first weapon on either side that has sufficient accuracy to ~~have~~ have some confidence that you can hit ~~significant~~ significant military targets without destroying towns. ^{And you can tell them,} If we have to do that, we suggest ^{in response,} that before you do anything rash, you get on the phone and call your towns in that vicinity, and you'll discover that they are all still there. You can then - (with an exception or two due to human error). Frankly, we won't foresee that. I'm giving a good deal of coherence to our approach, and not assuming realistically that these guys are crazy. But there is one very sound prediction to me. They will forget that a lot of those missiles ^{will in fact} hit towns.

Nyc: Can I ask about the mechanisms of your model? Because you seem to switch back and forth between them. I mean, in general, I think the model is...

D.E: We'll say, we'll use the Pershings, ^{your} the towns will still be there, and if you want you can then start ^a city exchange. We don't think you'll do that. We know you might, we know you could, but we don't think you will. "That has some credibility. Moreover we think then if you will - ^(let's face it - we don't think they'll do anything more than hit the Pershing sites in Europe, which is starting a whole exchange in this world; the other implication) The Russians by the way, I think almost surely ^{must} see this aspect of the Pershing, and I think, by the way, they will want a similar capability. It really is a useful tool. The Russians are doing very similar things. I can at least conjecture that they are doing them for similar reasons. Why did they modernize the SS 4's? They didn't have to do it. The SS20 certainly is not a retaliatory weapon, at ~~any~~ a theater level. You can't survive it even though it's said to be mobile. It's not that mobile. It's vulnerable. It is an escalation weapon itself, although not nearly as good as the Pershing because it has a bigger warhead. Not remotely as good as the Pershing. It is nevertheless - I conjecture that the Russians are playing the same game as we are to the extent - they're saying ^{two} can play this. You're not the only unstable side on this one. We may worry. We may pre-empt. We may disarm, and so on. Irrational though that may appear, you've got to worry too. We're not the only ones who have to ~~readily~~ tread lightly in the present ^{a crisis}

situation, we both better tread pretty lightly in this. " If I asked, what are they protecting by that? The answer that comes back to me is they are protecting what they are protecting with their tanks. Can I conjecture that they have reason to believe that the problem ^{of} holding on to the satellites may be more serious than it used to be.

Look at Poland and other cases.

D.E. They have reason to worry that the problem ^{of} holding onto Europe is going to get harder. They always appear to worry, in ways that Americans have thought very little about, ^{of} the possibility that West Germans and others ~~will get~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ involved - Eastern European uprising. Some Germans will say that's ridiculous, and most Americans will have never thought of such a possibility at all. Some Germans do think about the possibility, and there is evidence that the Russians think about the possibility. And if you want to make sure that Europe, Western Europe does not encourage Radio Free Europe, ^{the CIA,} does not encourage nor support satellite uprising ~~or~~ (which might tempt them to intervene), or, in the ~~XXXXXX~~ event, intervene in any way. A little instability there, and assurance that the Soviets might start a nuclear war ^{there, is extra deterrence.} I can hope that they are not as committed to that approach as we seem to be w/ Reagan. ^{That would mean they are} more willing to reverse ~~it if you~~ ^{it and to} have a freeze than we are. ~~XXXXXX they are not because we are~~ I hope they are, because we aren't, under Reagan, and they seem to be, and that would be ^a difference. But what I conjecture is that so long as we are going in this direction, they are going with us and perhaps see the same advantages in it. That would explain the kinds of weapons they are buying.

Q: Doesn't their conventional superiority ⁱⁿ Europe made that much less credible for them than ^{it} would be for us?

D.E. The question again is how sure they want to be ~~XX~~ that the West Germans under no circumstances involve themselves in ^{an} Eastern European uprising and ~~W~~ how much

then
fear that might happen. By the way, there is another possibility here. Pershing targets that I'm postulating would not be SS20s. The Pershing targets would be tactical things for say a Middle East War, at least under the circumstances I'm describing. The Soviets definitely do not want to be - I believe with high confidence that some of the rest, that this is one of the purposes of the Pershing^s. If that's the case, then the Soviets have reason to worry about getting hit by Pershings in a war that has nothing to do ^{in, really} with Eastern Europe → Western Europe; it just happens to be that the Pershing s are located in Western Europe because that's the only place we can put them and achieve the accuracy ^{of the Pershings, given their range.} They don't want that, and the SS20, for example, is a significant deterrent against that - which is to say, you may think it's not rational for us to reply to ~~XXXXX~~ attacks on our targets, on our country with Pershings, but you can't be sure that we won't and I wouldn't be sure.

Q: What do you think that they're likely to do ^{be willing to} ^{when they record} disassembling things ^{that they're already} ^(D.E. - what for structure?) structure of large accurate, vulnerable systems.

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I think that's a common ^{Misconception,} as I see it. It's certainly the public position of the administration. Over and over again at the media that the Russians first did this which...

Q: The 20 goes in in '77.

D.E.: yes,
The 20 goes in '77, but the Minuteman III with an NS20 guidance system and MarkXIII warhead goes in in '77. That's the first significant ^{hard} target kill on either side. Even though it doesn't cover the whole Soviet missile system, they say that

A: I say that
isn't the essence of what we're doing. The Minuteman III right now, right now

can disarm the Soviets at as great a fraction of their strategic warheads as the Soviets can by hitting our entire Minuteman systems. So the Minuteman III is comparable to the threat of the SS 18, and it came in four years ^{earlier.} ~~later.~~
The Russians didn't start that process actually. ^{Some, by the way, give the SS 20 -} The Russian answer that I've heard - not from Russians, but from Germans ^{who have talked to Russians -} - for the SS20 is that SALT II limited the number of warheads, kept them from using the SS16 (which didn't work very well anyway), ^{So they decided to multiply warheads by using the two stages of the - too.} ~~Richie said~~ there's the working of the bureaucratic politics with ^{horrible} results. It's a very bad move for the Soviets, as far as I can see, ^{politically,} in terms of what they got for it. Actually the kind of thing I'm talking about would be more the SS20 ^{23, which is coming along.} - So, what policy - this is a minor thing - I suggest for it, analytically or in an abstract form, certain ^{novelties} in that by emphasizing the ^{threat} both the relation of strategic forces to first-use forces. That is the essence of the Nitzsche analysis, but that was ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ regarded basically as a nutty right-wing analysis. ^{is now} Our policy. Moreover ^{it} didn't start with ^{Nitzsche} ~~Nixon~~, so I think I'm saying that ^{5 years ago} Nitzsche had a good model. If you want to understand our policy, listen closely to what ^{Nitzsche} ~~Mitchell~~ thinks is a good policy, not because he did it all, but he has the logic that they have been following. The second point that ^{Nitzsche} ~~Mitchell~~ - nobody that I know has ever made explicit - is that ⁱⁿ an era that like the present, unlike twenty years ago, the model in fact is based on the threat of pre-emptive attack which requires a degree of symmetry and capability on ^{the} two sides. It specifically requires a degree of vulnerability of your own weapons, ^{This looks like a quicky model to the other side.} But I'm saying in fact that this is roughly they had in mind and what we certainly have ^{in our mind?}

9 It doesn't explain... (about)... There's a good chunk of the budget that doesn't fit your model

D.L. Wait, let me say. What requires for your threat to work is that the Soviets can ^{plausibly} ~~possibly~~ take out a significant part of your force. It's not necessary, nor desirable, for them to ^{be able to} take out more than that. You don't want to actually

to tempt them to move first. You just want to say that you fear that they might go first. There is no advantage in saying ^{you} they are sure they'll go first. So, actually, as you buy these vulnerable weapons, you do well to buy invulnerable ones also, to counteract the effect, ^{of that a little bit.} To a layman, without knowledge of the Pentagon, it may well appear that additional invulnerable weapons cancel out the effect of the vulnerability. If the Russians can only take out a third of ^{your} ~~their~~ weapons - why would ^{they ever} go first, even if they thought we were going to go first? That's a plausible layman's assumption. To somebody who has lived with the Pentagon a great deal, that is not as reassuring as it ^{might} ~~may~~ be. If you heard the J.C.S. say, about eight years, say, we want to hit ^{Haiphong,} ~~High Farm~~ because that's where the stuff is actually coming in. The CIA says ^{But} ~~better~~ if it doesn't come in through ^{Haiphong,} it will come in through China. JCS says, ^{That's} your theory, but that's ~~hypothetical~~ hypothetical. It is coming in through ^{Haiphong,} we demand a right to hit ^{Haiphong.} It's not entirely stupid when they are saying that, because implicitly the wisdom under that is saying, ^{There} may be more reasons than we know that it's only coming in through ^{Haiphong.} Maybe it isn't as easy to come in through China as you think. "That's possible. Maybe political things ^(inaudible) - "let's do this and see what happens, is what they are saying." If we perturb the reality this way, it may not adjust so easily and a lot of military ^{wisdom} ~~risk~~ lies behind that. Thousands of years, you might say. But that's the way they think. The trouble is, so they might do it and that's the way the world ^{may} ~~might~~ end, actually. Because in the nuclear era - the military are much more careful than ^{some} ~~most~~ people think, but they aren't careful enough for me.

Q - I'm amazed ^{careful interweaving of} ~~that~~ your ^{to} ~~to see~~ rationality and irrationality. ^{this incredible edifice on the "What-if's"} (Island of rationality...?) We ^{to} ~~to see~~ the build-up, etc. Doesn't sound rational to me. For instance, it sounds like you're saying that the strategy is, ^{build} ~~build~~ arms to the teeth so that we can go steal an apple. ^{the} ~~an~~ and the Russians too; they want to keep the satellites. We're not going to get away with stealing ^{the} ~~an~~ apple. The implication of dropping a strategic limited nuclear weapon on Iran would be

the breakup of NATO, would have implications that - social implications that are - ^{totally} lie outside that logic, and no reasonable - it seems to me - no reasonable strategist for the United States ~~will~~ would be willing to kind of go along with that kind of rationality - which I understand - which is basically "I'm going to take an apple because if you don't like it I'm going to kill you, 'yah you'll kill me too." It makes perfect sense except that there are other reasons why you wouldn't get away with it. How does that fit in?

D.F.: OK, you have a very good point in observation. ~~The~~ First of all I'm saying - I can say on the one hand, here's an interesting model, let's see how it goes. But I am saying, I'm willing to say more than that. As far as I currently understand things, this correspondence ^{to my understanding of} the way things are, and that the interweaving of rationality and irrationality reflects ~~reality~~ reality. It isn't just enough to make - ^{it isn't just} to put together to make an interesting model. Of course I have no question, as I ^{would} hope - my activities are only partly analytical - ^{which I think is what I've described,} my other activities reflect my belief that what is being done ^{is} is deeply irrational in another sense, in a long-run sense, I think it is leading with HIGH probability, not just a possibility, to absolute catastrophe, ^{to} unprecedented, unimaginable catastrophe. In fact that seems so clear to me that I have to confront the challenge, if I think these people have some sense at all, how can I explain that they are doing something so deeply recklessly? But I am saying that I think that one of the factors that keeps it going, and it is happening and it is dangerous, you'll agree on that. ^{This is not a fantasy that I have imagined} What is being done, for whatever motive, is in fact dangerous. The next question is, why is it happening? ^{and} A major reason for knowing why it is happening is not just so we can write the obituary, ^{a post-mortem beforehand...} but in order to change it. I think we can change it better if we understand it better. I think that to understand ^{it better} than most people do is to understand that there are elements of partial and short-term rationality in the sense that certain objectives are believed to be achievable by this approach. Moreover, this belief is based to some degree on evidence and reason and third, that in fact - they do believe and they have some reason to

believe that it works and that's what we're ^{dealing with} doing. ^{But now we have the question} How ~~many~~ could anyone want to do this for apples? I think the answer to that is that certain - there are possible losses that they see which require this mechanism which cannot be prevented by any other means that certain people can imagine, and which they do not regard ^{as mere apples} - very specifically, loss of U.S. control ~~at~~ the distribution of the oil of the Middle East is regarded as ~~being~~ having so great a bearing on our ^{hegemony} over Western Europe in our financial ^{hegemony} in the world, and generally our power position and our profit position, as to justify a rather considerable risk of losing of it ^{all}. At the same time, I do think that the following element of irrationality does enter. I'm increasingly coming to believe this. By ~~in~~ your own consideration, ^{can} how they be doing this? I've asked myself this question over and over and if I could talk to David Rockefeller I would perhaps have a better sense of it. But I'm beginning to guess that David Rockefeller, like a lot of other people, believe that the war will in fact never happen. He doesn't believe what I believe. ^{as I believe they are} He believes the risks are not as high ^{as I believe they are} and if I ask how he can think that, I can break it down into components. In fact one just came to me from ^a Germany. For some time I've been thinking that they have an irrational belief that if we buy enough weapons and we're willful enough and ready enough to use it, the other side will always back down, especially when they realize how transcendent our interest is compared to ~~their~~ theirs. In part I know from experience ~~experience~~ how commonly these men of power can underestimate the resolution and tenacity of their opponents. That happens all the time on every side. It isn't just ~~capitalists~~ ^{who make that mistake,} capitalists. So that leads them to overestimate how well this thing will work. That's what I differ ^{from them} - I don't think I would ^{have} advise ^{Brezhnev} Brezhnev to go into Afghanistan, but somebody did and it's very clear ~~that~~ they expected to win quickly. I would not have expected that. Somebody told the Vietnamese ^{high up,} that the Cambodians could not possibly resist them very long. They are still fighting. The ^{Iraqis} ~~Arabs~~ - they obviously assumed

^{we have less confidence}
^{I suppose, in their}
^{judgment, ... but}

that they could take over the Iranian^s and they had some reason to believe that,
~~they~~ Given the way the Iranians worked, ~~they~~ were wrong. The Israel^{is} thought
the PLO would be totally out of the picture by now. Maybe they are right,
but probably they are wrong. A lot of ~~people~~ people make that kind of mis-judgment.
It seems that power disposes you to it. ^A Kind of contempt for your racially
inferior opponent, your neighbor. There is another side that I just learned
last week in Germany. I was talking to a high-level research guy for the ~~SSB~~ ^{SPD}
on disarmament, who said that he was in favor of first-use. Germany must have
a selective use, demonstrative use of nuclear weapons. We cannot afford another
occupation, we cannot afford another World War II, we cannot forego this.
I said, OK, in the last result, ^{in desperation, you use your card,} you do your selective use and they don't stop,
or they reply. What do you do then? He said, then you quit. A light bulb
flashed over my head. It may not be quite that clear in a lot of people's mind,^s
but I think that when it comes to playing this game of instability, that ~~our~~ ^{there are}
leaders who think, ^{"If} the other side doesn't give in, I will, I'll stop.
I won't be defeated, I won't surrender, but ^{short} ~~that~~ of that. ["] ~~If~~ ^{It} comes back to
me - Lyndon Johnson saying when George Ball told him in 1965 - "Lyndon you're going
to end up with 500,000 troops in Vietnam" and he said "Get out of here George,
you're crazier than hell." ^{Meaning what?} No one had told him you can do this job with less
than 500,000 troops. ^{Outsiders thought that,} but they were wrong. That's what I
demonstrated in ^{the Pentagon} ~~papers~~. ^{That's why I put them out.} The President had always been told that this might, in
fact, and probably would, require 500,000 troops, so why was he so confident that
we wouldn't be doing it? The answer was, ^{"I'll quit before that. I'll never} ~~for that~~ ^{put 500,000 troops}
Why did Kennedy put advisors in, fearing as he did that - even told that they
wouldn't be enough, ^{They} ~~might~~ ^{not} be enough, and at least ^{they would keep him} ~~keep it~~ from losing. He was
determined ^{not} to send combat troops in. He thought that would be disastrous. So
why did he put the advisors in? Because he thought he wouldn't put combat troops
in. Was he right? Almost surely not. Maybe he would have decided to lose
Vietnam in 1964, unlike Johnson, but that's not the way to bet. These guys do
overestimate their willingness and ability to stay on top of that situation,

to control it, and if necessary ^{to} lose the war, even though the fighting has started. I'm been racking my brain to think of an example of somebody who decided to lose a shooting war because the - because the costs had gotten too high. (Actually there is one example - De Gaulle)

Q - The Japanese?

Well, I'm talking of course short of - you're talking about, they're comparable to Hitler in the bunker type of situation. ^{I don't mean that} ~~I'm not talking about if nobody~~ surrenders. People surrender at the end of ^a the war. jI'm talking about in the course of the war people say, I don't like the way this is going ^{and they lose it - they} - get out.

You see what Harry Truman did was something comparable to that when the Chinese invaded North Korea, he not only didn't end the war, he wasn't able to end the war. He just couldn't bring himself to offer the terms that Eisenhower did offer. He could have done it, he didn't do it. He didn't end the war. There's no reason to think that Truman could have ended it as well as Eisenhower did

^{Now} ~~A few people can~~ in ... Yeah ... It's a gamble. That's why I thought Nixon would end the war in '69. So, it can happen, but Eisenhower's example - [by the way the other example in my mind is DeGalle. He gave up on (Andriquet?) He could have kept the war going, but he could see that the war would have gone on forever, basically. Clearly someone not doing it (Inaud...) or Thatcher, earlier.

There's a lot of people, I'm thinking of course of World War I, ^{a primary example.} But also the inability to end Korea and the inability to end the bombing in Vietnam. ^{That's a very strong example.} They just couldn't bring themselves to do it and the public had to take that away from them.

Congress had to take it away. Last thought on how would you break through this model ... I don't Reagan will do it. The Russians don't seem to be inclined to stop the game unilaterally. Reagan is not willing to stop the game bilaterally,

^{Ac} prefers the game because - perhaps he does think we can win, and in any case he thinks it's indispensable.

Congress could stop it the way they stopped the bombing in Vietnam by taking

away the funds. At least with the excuse that until the President is willing to offer a bilateral freeze, they would not provide further funds, ^{for} An arms race that would make the freeze unattainable, since if the Pershing continues to be tested, it's quite unlikely that the Soviets will accept the freeze two years from now when we have a Pershing and they don't. In order to prevent that, it makes absolute sense to stop that testing NOW, if you want to end the arms race. You can't wait two years for Reagan's successor. By the way, that's what a lot of people are putting their hopes on. Quite reasonably, and it may be what has to happen, but I'm very worried about that. I think two years from now, three years from now, and the successor gets down to it, it's too late. We have a working Pershing in Europe by that time and the Russians have a SS23 being tested and SS21 and SS22 on their own into East Europe, maybe they are launch-on-warning and MAYBE they are posting Trident-type submarines off our shores regularly, and the whole thing is a hell of a lot hotter than it is right now. I don't want to wait for that. I think it's essential that the Congress be pressed by the kinds of actions taken during the Vietnam War to cut off the funding for that in the face of Presidential intransigence. And to that end I'm going from here to Washington this weekend to take part in the freeze lobbying ^{on this issue} and if Congress votes the funds for the MX testing in ^{from Vandenberg} March or April, which is 50-50 possibility - it's ^{a little} really hard to believe they really ~~ever~~ ^{won't ever} don't test this missile, which is standing there all ready to be tested, and they will never light the match - ^{my hopes don't run that high} if they light that match, there will be about a thousand people facing felony federal charges by being on the base so that the test ~~MX~~ cannot take place until they are all rounded up on this large reservation, because they say they won't do the test as long as there are unauthorized people endangered by falling ^{debris from the test} So we will slow up that test by a few hours, ^{which is insignificant} but we will also demonstrate that there are about a thousand people in this country, ^{who would} rather be arrested for five-year charges, than see that testing ^{take} place unopposed, and I think Congress and others will get the message that where there are a thousand like that, unpopular though they may be, ^{they are not as unpopular as they used to be} there are a lot more than a thousand who have comparable feelings, ^{who aren't out there}

I think this is one useful ingredient. It proved useful in the Vietnam War,
it had a useful effect on me. I remember when ^{Randy Kehler went} to prison for
draft resistance, ^{and others did.} So I think this can have a useful effect, so I'll be getting
as Professor ^{Bennett} Gibson, Harvard Medical School got arrested last week
at a sitin at the Sperry Rand ^{Corporation in N.Y.} which makes parts for the Pershing Missile.
I think this is useful as part of the campaign, lobbying, ^{electoral activity, go ed} letter writing, etc. ^{pieces}
All of which are essential, and the essentiality is measured by the need to
stop the deployment of Pershing ^{missiles} while Reagan is in office. A difficult, but
fortunately not impossible, task.

Four

~~THEY~~, rather than what Tomas Powers said they had, which was 1,000. He was wrong by 250 times, (not percent). So, in short, they had no missiles. That was the up-shot of the missile ^{gap}~~guide~~ and ~~THEY~~ as late then as the Cuban Missile Crisis in '62, when they had 10 missiles, 17 years into the nuclear era, they had essentially no capability to retaliate to a U.S. first strike. At the most they could retaliate against Europe, but they would have done that at the cost of being naked to devastation by the U.S. Bought nothing. They were totally bluffing. This Eisenhower knew and the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew. As I said, because the opposite was used to mobilize Americans ^{support} for the weapons that supported our threats, our superiority, the actual degree of American superiority was never admitted, even to this day. If you look at most accounts of that period, supposedly based on official reports, the ^{Int. Inst. of Soc. Studies} IISS, they will say 50 ICMS, much less than expected. Off by a factor of ten. Fifty is two per SAK base., big difference from four. So in short, when Kennedy told the American people to prepare for a possible nuclear war arising over Berlin, [they should have fall-out shelters by the end of the year in '61. He said that in July of 1961. Any of you remember that?) I find that people ^{who} were five years old at the time. ^{they remember} They actually remember that period just as well as the Cuban crisis ^{a year later} because of the effect ^{it had} on their families. Did your family understand then, as far as you know, ^{or have you ever understood,} that if a nuclear war had arisen over Berlin in '61, it would not have been ^{begun} done as a nuclear war by the Soviet Union. ^{I ask audiences that, and} Did you know that? In audiences, I see hands - 100 or so hands of people who remember the period. No one ever admits - in fact I'll tell you frankly, if one or two hands raise and say that they did conceive of U.S. first strike at that time I know I'm looking at an old lefty. It had to be raised by Communist hands to ~~XXXXX~~ believe in 1961 that the plan ^{Kennedy was} we were talking about was a U.S. first strike. ^{in the sense I'm describing - an escalatory first strike.} But in fact Kennedy, I can say, from working on this problem at the time, did not fear that the Soviets would initiate nuclear war with their four ICBMs at that time. He was not talking about nuclear war that ^(when?) shelters might have arose from us. Fall-out worked very well, miserable as they were, at that time. There might have been a little fall out in the U.S. from a couple of ~~explosions~~ explosions. Very unlikely to be more than that. So, when you ask now ^{have} ~~where~~

these things bluffs, I don't think they were bluffs and I don't think the Russians thought they were bluffs. ^{The} Actual situation was quite different from what the American public imagined it to be. ^{As when Acheson said... I recall} I gave a lecture here in Boston at the Lowell Institute. I used - I used ^{Kruschev's} statements ^{Hitler-like} at the time, which were scaring me, they sounded very ^A. He said if you send tanks into Berlin, they will burn, make no mistake about it. If you send tanks after them, our rockets will fly automatically. It sounded pretty bad. Where? He didn't have any ICBMs when he said that in '58 and '59. He did have MREMs, but if his MREMs had flown, a lot of Europeans would have died and Russia would have been in the words of the ^{SAC briefing at that time} "smoky, radiating ruin," ^{within two hours, forever} and he knew that. Pure bluff. On the other hand, Acheson said it's insane to be making threats like this. He said to use massive retaliation is to experience the enemy's ability to massive ^W retaliate against us. He didn't have it. So in fact these threats and plans were far more serious than even I believed before I saw through the Missile Guidance

Q: Who precisely knew that there were only 4 ICBM's?

DE: Not me. What is clear now from studies - I conclude that the Joint Chiefs - ^{I could give lots of evidence which I won't go into. But I have a belief} I will not say ^A certainty - I will not say 100% certainty - very strong belief confirmed by lots of other people - that the Joint ^{so} chiefs understand very very well ~~that~~ what the situation was and why they were saying otherwise. Why they were lying, and Eisenhower, who of ~~course~~ course denied that there was a Missile ^{Gap} Guide, knew why he was saying that. He didn't have ^{his head on "Burke's tree" and when he said that} - he knew there weren't any missiles. The U-2, by the way, was flying during that period which most people didn't know. ^{He} Chose not to back up his statement of confidence with ~~Kruschev's~~ revealing the the U2 flying even though ^{Kruschev} Krevcheu knew it. He kept Krevcheu's secret - he didn't embarrass ^{Kruschev} Krevcheu by announcing that he had U2 ^{Kruschev} photographs, lest ^{Kruschev} Krevcheu be forced into various reactions. So they kept each other's secret.

Q: By '61 who knew?

The Estimate that I learned was - came out in Sept. '61, the new estimate.
D.C. The official written estimate came out in 1961 and it was based now having completed, total foot-by-foot, cloud-free coverage of Russia where you could just count every inch of Russia by reconnaissance satellites which had started flying in 1960, and the data was complete by the summer of 1961. ⁷⁴ Led to an intelligence estimate that the Russians had less than four, less than ten - they found four. By January of the following year, the next estimate said four. That was known by Sept. '61... ^{Something is foreboding} A funny bureaucratic thing had happened in '58. ^{from National Intelligence estimates in 58.} All contractors had been cut off for NIE. '58 was the height of the Missile Gap, it was before the Army and Navy began to dissent strongly from the Air Forces's ^{predictions}. The army and navy had been saying right along that there are no missiles over there. But ^{last} RAND's ^{lost} estimate, national estimate, was in '58. At that point the national estimates, right after that, in late '58, began registering these strong Army dissents from the ^{missile gap} national prediction. But ^{RAND} Rand never saw those. ^{RAND} Rand from '58 on only ~~we~~ saw ^{that} Air Force estimates, which were saying thousands, hundreds, and ^{RAND} the Rand attitude was that, was an exaggeration, ^{they} probably don't have more than a few hundreds, not thousands. ^{RAND'S} But Rand ~~was~~ thinking was preserved in amber. ^{from} In the month I joined in '58 throughout, they were not aware that evidence had been building up and building up that there were no missiles there, they weren't aware of that. So I happened to be in Washington when this new estimate came out, and although I wasn't in theory a ^{RAND} Rand person, who as a direct consultant, so I did see it. I was the first person to know this. ^{RAND} Rand was not entitled to know it, but the way the secrecy system works, is if you feel these people really do have a need to know, you tell them. So I convened a top-secret briefing on Rand, which was extremely unusual at ^{RAND} Rand. ^{RAND} Rand worked at a secret level, not a top-secret level and secret is almost - is just literal toilet paper in the Pentagon. Almost anything you saw was top

secret. But Rand worked at a secret level, so I convened this top-secret briefing which made a very big deal with Rand, it meant that everybody had to signed in and a guard outside the door. I got all the top people and I never used charts in my briefings. This time I had a chart which I had written myself and I said: Herman always says you should have a chart. So I prepared some charts for you. First chart: Yes, Virginia there is a missile gap. Second chart: It is currently running ten to one. Third chart: In our favor, and I gave details. Total unbelief. I had no effect, as far as I ever found, on the opinion of anyone. How do you know that? Well, I happen to know by something higher than top secret, which I was not free to tell, which I feel free to tell you now. ^{The} Data came from detailed reconnaissance satellites. That was a super secret, higher than top secret, so I couldn't tell them how ^{then} I knew that. So, everybody there sitting around the table, Harvey DeReadon ^(in aud) all bull shit - how would they know that? Being wishful, being optimistic. What it meant was that what ^{RAND} Rand had been doing for several, ^{(and I'm} ~~and then~~ going off ~~to~~ ^{into} bureaucratic politics, ^{here} what Rand had been doing for several years had been entirely based on the presumption, not necessarily so much of the missile gap, but ^a general deterrent gap, of ^a the Soviet surprise intention and capability, the ^{with a surprise} intent to threaten us - whether they would use it or not, ^{It was assumed that they would spare} No effort to acquire ^{such a} capability. ^{and they had the capability to do it.} ~~so the threat~~ - ^{RAND} Rand had become entirely focused on this one problem, from pursuing all kinds of different interests six years earlier, bit by bit everybody had become concentrated on this one problem: preventing a Soviet capability for surprise attack in 1960 and 1961. What I was telling them was - ~~we~~ pulling the curtain aside, and there's nothing there. Like the Wizard of Oz, pay no attention to that man behind the curtain. There was nothing there. They refused to believe that. They did not believe that. It had no affect on ^{RAND} Rand operations for several years, and gradually the mood seeped through from Washington. ^{the} The people just weren't fascinated by surprise attack anymore, so the ^{RAND'S} Rand's strategic

program then delegated to the care of a young, quite mediocre analyst that I had recommended hiring - from Harvard, not a dumb guy, ^{not a marvelous analyst, but} Nobody else wanted the job, so ^{Jim Schlesinger} took over and later ^{had a rather mediocre} a career ~~because~~ because he was the only Republican with Harvard - economic sort of man. Strategist, so he was eligible, ^{for the Nuclear role} became Secretary of Energy, CIA and defense. I had the feeling that I started ~~it all~~ ^{him on his career}.

that's in a sense ~~anecdotal~~ ^{anecdotal}.

Now let's get up to the ^{present}. Let me put one element of reality into this. ~~The~~ First in reality, something happens. Superiority of course, goes - the ability to disarm the Soviet Union goes as a result of our successes. Specifically, our success in '58, contributing largely to ^{the} Sino /Soviet split, was confirmed by Khrushchev's back down again which was a major complaint against Khrushchev along with his ^(maverick) policies. Had a good deal to do with his departure and ~~his~~ replacement by ^{Brezhnev} Brezhnev who makes a deal with the military out of his perspective, he gets the backing of the military by assuring them they will have anything they need to achieve parity with the U.S. They will not have to ~~back down~~ ^{reason, now. And they were} for that, and spent an immense amount of money then and acquired ^{one} for the next decade parity. More significantly than parity, they begin to pour concrete around their silos, with the accuracy then available of U.S. missiles, it's no longer possible to ^{disarm} design the Soviet ^{Union} - to be credible that you are going to initiate nuclear weapons ~~XXXXX~~ at any level against the Soviet troops, outside the Soviet, ^{(to repeat my model),} or a Soviet ally, ^{st reason,} You want to have a good deal, to be credible, to believe that they won't reply. The only ~~XXXXX~~ reason they won't reply would be that it is credible ^{that} you would escalate the conflict, and if they would reply to that, you would go to a first strike. The only way to make a first strike credible under any circumstances, is if you have reason to believe ^{that} you can significantly disarm ^{it} your opponent. Since 1967 when the Soviets - ^{but the missiles weren't really operational in large numbers until 1970} they began to harden in 1965, - ^{at} at the same time they got Polaris submarines - they still don't

have submarines, it seems with solid-fuel missiles. They ^{have} had problems with their submarines. They began to have submarines at sea with ~~some~~ nuclear capabilities. From that time on, neither side could under any circumstances attack the other and deprive the opponent of the ability to annihilate your own society. ^{With their remaining capabilities.} However much you could disarm them you ^(or even only had second strike capabilities) couldn't really deprive them of their ability to annihilate you. By this time, this is very late now, this is 22 years into the nuclear era, about '69. '69 by the way, is the year ^{in which} Nixon did make a nuclear threat ^{in imitation of} Eisenhower against an ally of the Soviet Union. It wasn't very likely that the Soviets reply to it and they really didn't worry about it. May not be unrelated to the fact though that the Vietcong did not buckly in to that threat. Above all, parity of retaliatory ^{capability}. Sufficient retaliatory ^{capability on each side} is not conducive to making ~~XXXX~~ credible first-use threats. Indeed, for some years MacNamara and his successors had been assuming that the era of first-use threats was essentially over and would have to be replaced by something. and Since he hadn't been partial to first-use threats from the beginning - (that was the basis to my loyalty to him) - I was - my attitudes on the cold war were very committed. My attitudes against ^{insurgency} at that time, with my understanding of Vietnam, were - I accepted the goals of ^{Counter-Insurgency} and of course I've changed my opinion ~~at~~ a lot on that. On nuclear I've actually never changed my opinions. I've always assumed that first-use was disastrously and wrong. First strike was disastrously wrong and when I worked in the Pentagon it was to avoid initially a Soviet first strike, ^{when I thought that was a bad thing} And then to avoid the possibility of war by accident. So MacNamara had been against first-use for a long time, ^{as the NATO allies suspected.} And he had been building up non-nuclear forces which enabled him to send ~~5,000,000~~ 500,000 troops to Vietnam, without mobilizing the reserve. Made Vietnam possible without going to Congress to ^{mobilize} ~~mobilize~~ the reserve. That failed. So by the mid-70s, and especially by the late 70s, two new considerations - three things had changed the situation, from what they appeared ^{to be} in '68 and '69. First of all, ^(I'll say 4 things) the need for U.S. intervention - there seemed no ~~reduced~~ need for U.S.

intervention - for efforts by somebody to maintain U.S. imperial interests. ^{spread of influence}

There was just as much rebellion as there had ever been, in fact there was more.

Second, with the fall of the Shah in '79, which was very surprising, accompanied by the fall of Samosa, which was also very surprising, the policy that Nixon had evolved as a substitute for first-use threats, namely proxy, regional ^{representatives of} ~~regional~~ ^{the world} looked very sick. If the Shah could fall, Saudis were much weaker than that and anywhere else, anybody else was a risk. The U.S. expeditionary forces have to be thought of ^{again. Second} - after Vietnam there was going to be no sending of 500,000 troops to back up the first 100,000. You had to do it a different way and the different way had always been what the Joint Chiefs had said after Korea: never again without nuclear weapons. That had been rescinded under Maxell Taylor and Kennedy. "We'll do it without nuclear weapons." That failed. The lesson drawn ~~XXXX~~ by a lot of people from that, not only Republicans, ^{was} they were right the first time. You've got to back up those troops with heavy ~~XX~~ air power and if the ^{heavy} air power isn't enough, you have to prepared to use nuclear weapons, if you can get away with it. Third, you have this problem, the Russians now existed as opponents, nuclear opponent in the way they had not existed before. Now a technical factor emerged. The silos had again become soft ^{despite} ~~to spite~~ their concrete, because of the ^{MIRVing -} ~~merging~~ multiple warheads and the the increased accuracy, in particular - apparently, I know now from study, had been foreseen, ^{very early.} People saw the accuracy coming from the early 60s. The ^{MIRVing} ~~merging~~ was not seen quite so early, but from the late 60s they could see a combination of ^{MIRVing} ~~merging~~ and high accuracy which meant large numbers of accurate warheads. Moreover ^{yield} ~~yield~~ to weight was improving, so those ^{MIRVed} ~~merged~~ warheads could be big enough, with their accuracy, to destroy a hardened missile. However, so in a sense, just as you could destroy air fields in the 50s and 60s, you could now destroy hardened missiles. ^{w/ MIRVs, over there}

Q: It's not that if we send warheads ^{before their hardened} are, they're going to know missiles destroyed. You can't destroy

Therefore ^{they will have to} launch on warning. ^{No matter} How accurate and how big, You're not going to be able to destroy...

^{You're going right} Let me say now two or three ^{I can now build the} - current situation, ^{as I see it. A} New theory for me, so I want to try it out, ^{on such minds} There is no way, and never will be a way, of making even ^{let alone a} little ~~on the~~ high ~~confidence~~ first-strike by either side, under any conditions. But even a middle ~~confidence~~ first strike anymore, and there never will be again. It's not - paper calculations ~~will~~ tell you that with enough warheads you can wipe out those missiles, but the trouble is the size of the forces is too large. The operational factors which are going to ^{defeat, with} ~~an~~ inability to test this beforehand, ~~it~~ means that you have to deal with weapons that have only been tested partially for such operations. This is undersood. ^{Schlesinger} was saying as early as '74, as he bought accurate weapons and called for funds for accuracy testing, never-the-less testified very clearly that a good first-strike is impossible. In fact he said a real first-strike is impossible for all kinds of operational reasons. You will still leave too much on the other side, no matter how well you carry this thing out. They'll still have the ability to destroy you.

^{Q:} Just a judgment ^{on your part}. You mentioned that the Air Force overestimated number of weapons ^{on} ~~from~~ the other side ^{by a factor of magnitude of 200.} I've always suspected them of under estimating their dispersions by about ^{which you have} ~~followed more closely than I...~~

It's a complicated story, but - and a very closely held one. The knowledge both of our own accuracy, and above all, the accuracy of Russian missiles [apparently the data on which estimates are based - of the accuracy of Russian missiles, are known to something like 2, 3 or 4 people in the U.S. government. Extremely ^{subtle analysis, and} tightly held - possibly very questionable. I do know people relatively close to the problem who feel that these estimates are just bull shit, to a large extent.

One thing is very clear. I have heard enough from people close to the problem say reliability is a matter of extreme uncertainty. How many of those missiles ~~will~~ will actually take off at the time they are suppose to. They give factors of 80%. It might be 20%, 5%. When you say we need two warheads per missile, that's to allow for the reliability of the missile. The warhead is supposed to be accurate enough ^{to get the job done, but} to allow for the reliability of the missile on the assumption of 80% reliability. ^{you} Figure on two cross-targeted warheads. 80% may be absolutely crazy and in fact every time they have to tried to fire a Minuteman missile from an operational silo, which is only about four times, they have failed every time and gave up. It was too discouraging. The same may be true for the Russians. All this is very, just terribly ~~concerning~~ ^{concerning}.

Back to another point, that may be the answer. I think I shouldn't have allowed your analogy in answering my question on overkill. Your analogy was ^{can} the Soviet Union have ^{too} as many tanks in Europe ^{it} the point is to oppress the local populations. I don't think that analogy works

D.E.: Because the population will not pre-empt the tanks. But wait. ^{You've got your finger on a right point, but I'm going to use it to drive home.} Let me say right now, to define the problem a little bit, What I think people in the administration believe - and by the way let me say it is not my perception that the people in this administration are radically different in their thinking from those of the Carter administration. Certainly their programs are not different. The programs are the same in almost every respect. The B-1 was added, otherwise the programs are the same, they are somewhat larger in scale ^{and spending,} and I think the unlying ~~XXI~~ rationale is the same. Let ^{you're} not just talking about a pathology of ^{one set of guys in the Reagan} administration. I believe, but let me conjecture, ^{as a hypothesis} that most of them, ^{and} in the highest level ones, do not believe what they appear to be saying, a lot of the time, that they could achieve the capability of having a good first strike defense against the Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union could have a good first strike against us in the sense of having any degree of confidence

that they would not be annihilated. Or that a limited war of any size could be controlled - there are by the way, ^{a few people} who do believe that, and they are indeed peculiarly in this administration - dangerous. There are a number of genuine nuts in this administration, ^{by any standards. But} I'm not assuming that those people are in command, ^{in this situation. So} I'm assuming the prevailing attitudes at least don't have to be, and really aren't - ^{some of the things are being} belief that a large-scale, two-sided, nuclear war can be limited, or controlled, or limited to Europe, or won in any useful human sense. They of course say the contrary in all these things, but I can easily explain their saying it without assuming they believe it, ^{as part of a threat strategy} So I ~~am~~ am saying that what they say, as well as what they buy, does reflect a desire, in a sense, to bluff the Soviets and other opponents.

9: The Soviets know.

N: They are not saying we will certainly do this. They are saying certain things in hope of making the Soviets fear that we might do certain things.

W: They have reason, I say, to believe that they can succeed in this. Now let me explain that. How you make it reasonable at all that to go to the highest level now, that you will ^{either} escalate at the theater, ^{level with, say, a Pershing, or} against the Soviet Union, or using MX against the Soviet Union. How can you make that ^{plausible} at all given the likelihood of ^{retaliation?} the. If you can't make it plausible at all, you have great difficulty making plausible your threats to use little ^{neutron} ~~neutron~~ bombs against an ally, ^{of the S.U. And} and if you do use a little ^{neutron} ~~neutron~~ bomb, you will do so without a whole lot of confidence that you won't get something back on the same level, ^{in the case} and you'll be in ^{anything} Then, trouble, as you won't have gained. The onus will be on you then to carry out your threats of escalation, ^{You won't want to do it.} which by implication are totally irrational.

So you have reason to hope that you can make those threats to escalate somewhat credible, in order to make it so you won't have to use ^{neutron} ~~neutron~~ bombs and if you do use them you can use them safely. Now I want to add one last thing. I ^{premise} ~~premise~~ the belief that we do want our threats to be ^{fairly} ~~thoroughly~~ credible in

desperate circumstances that we will use ~~these~~ tactical nuclear weapons, rather than suffer a defeat ^{and more over} I think they do contemplate the possible necessity of using those tactical ~~W~~ nuclear weapons. — Actually exploding them, and they really do want as much assurance as they can that there will be no reply, or at most a very limited reply that doesn't cancel out — To do this they must make it as credible as possible and fairly credible that they would escalate if they did get a reply. That my model. How could they do that? The answer. ^{You} ~~They~~ need weapons to escalate with if it's ~~credible~~ credible that you're going to deliberately press the button, not in a fit of drunken ^{dispare} dispare. If you have to do that, that, — that's the state Nixon was in the night of the alert in 1973, and not because of the war but because ^{he was in command} it was two days after the Saturday Night Massacre. He could not be communicated with on the phone because he was too drunk. Therefore, he was not a part of the decision to launch the single largest alert we've had since the Cuban missile crisis. But if he had been just sober enough and could have communicated that over the hot line that night, he ~~was~~ would have been an impressive threatener, that particular night. At least the Russians would have done well to be worried. That's of course back to my 1959 lecture ^{on the} political uses of madness. Nixon referred to his threats in '69 to Haldman. I had given those lectures in part to Henry Kissinger, ^{to his seminar on political uses of madness} So when I read in Halderman's book that Nixon said to Halderman, "I'm going to tell the ~~Kissinger~~ ^{Hogimein} that I have my finger on the nuclear button," (he said Kissinger is going to tell them that Nixon has his finger on the nuclear button, and you know that guy is so crazy and he hates the Soviets so much, he might do anything). ^{He said} Hogimein will be in Paris the next day. He said, "I call it the madman theory." I had an uneasy feeling that not the concept, but the title of that little strategy came via ^{Henry Kissinger} from '59. OK, that's one way to do it. Be mad. But that has its own cost, as we saw from Nixon. How can you make it possible? Here's the answer. There's only one way in the modern world to make it credible that you would deliberately launch strategic weapons, whether

Pershings or MXs, and that, if you believe, if it's plausible that you believe that you are about to be struck first. Even that I postulated to my mind, or to your mind, ~~there~~ would be no reason to strike first, pre-emptively. What good is it going to do? But I can tell you from experience in the Pentagon and I wonder if you ^{would} disagree, if you ask me will there be high-level military men in that situation who will say very soberly, "you must use these weapons before we lose them." I will say yes, you bet your life on it, ^{there will be.} Might the President do that? Who knows, but I wouldn't bet my life that he wouldn't and the Russians would do well not to bet that way, and they won't. They know... A pre-emptive capability, ^{and this is your real problem here - maybe if I write an article} to be a threat, - ^{will be an article} to my knowledge pre-emption has never been discussed as a threat, but a ^{form} part of insurance, ^{a pre-emptive} a way of limiting damage, ^{if you're} I'm saying that there is actually is only one circumstance in which first-strike is actually credible anymore, and that is a pre-emptive, (not an escalatory, that's suicide.) But a pre-emptive threat can be made credible because of the known and real ^{prediction of} ~~for~~ the military controls. ^{10's.} It is credible that they will use those weapons, if they fear that the alternative is to lose them, and that they MIGHT have some good effect. "They might have some good effect" means that they must have an ability to disarm the enemy to some significant degree. If ^{they} ~~that~~ can't that, (as the Soviets couldn't in '61, you don't have a pre-emptive capability. ^{Their 4 ICBMs had no perceptible effect on us.} They had no incentive to pre-emp, ^{with them.} they might have done it, but it wouldn't be very logical. ^{rational. But to show} So a real pressure to do, you have got to have some significant ability to disarm the other side, even if you leave them with quite a bit else. ^{The} SEcond point is if it be a threat, you have to make it credible in some circumstances you might believe that the enemy was about to strike you. Now if he can't disarm you at all significantly, it's not going to be very credible that you fear that he is about to strike you, unless you think he is crazy. If all we have is submarines and all he has is land-based missiles, a pre-emptive attack on his part does not look very credible, and it doesn't look very credible that we would ever come to fear that he was about to strike us, he would gain nothing by doing it. In order then to have a credible appearance,

basis, for believing that you are about to be struck, and believing that it was preferable to pre-empt, both sides must have a vulnerable counterforce capability. To have a pre-emptive ^{threat,} both sides have to have a pre-emptive threat, ^{in the way that I have defined it.} Both sides must be to some degree vulnerable to the other. ~~That's it.~~

In that case you can say, because of his vulnerability, perhaps, he fears that I'm about to strike him, or for some other reason, in this hot crisis -

[not out of the blue - ^{it probably has to be a war? have been} probably nuclear weapons will have to be going off at that time. ^{Let me describe the current situation.} There's a real situation. If one way or another, Soviet ~~troops~~XXXX

and U.S. troops were fighting one another, right now, and one side being outnumbered, presumably the U.S., ^(they're not going to be fighting us in Mexico; we might be fighting in their Mexico; Iran) we would be outnumbered. If we were led to use nuclear weapons, ^{in that situation,} and each side would be - each side would now be looking ahead two ^{moves. They would say, the} years. ~~The~~ next step is

either - nuclear weapons just landed on Soviet divisions and passes in Iran ^{"our only way of stopping that, basically"} (which we have plans for and always have) either the Soviets reply or they don't. If they don't, we can maybe stalemate, ^{then.} If they do, presumably it's in the area, ^{They don't want to commit} suicide. But if they reply in the area, they wipe out any advantage we have. They knock out our bases, our air support, or whatever it is. Either we surrender at that time, we drop ~~XXX~~ out, we let them have Iran, or whatever.

[9. ^{it won't be much} It depends where the weapons went off. Air bursts. Nixon had in mind in 1969

a very ~~low~~ low-yield, high-altitude air burst over a railroad trans shipment ~~XX~~ point in North Vietnam a mile and a half from the Chinese border with no civilians miles around. The estimate is about three ^{civilian} dead - a signal, ^{quite} but an important signal. Vietnam would still be there. To that then, either we then

escalate, big or small, ^{and small would have to be something like Pershings - if we have pershings. Not today - that's a few years from now.} and now it would have to be something else.] The Soviets would either reply to

that or they don't. In either case each side must be thinking seriously, where is this going. Each side knows that the other must be thinking, "We may be

hours away from all-out war. Does it pay us to wait to find out, or to wait for that to come to pass on the hope that it won't go that far?" Each side will be

contemplating ^{Should we surrender} surrender - but frankly, ^{they will not be thinking that a} that wise. ^{what} But they will be thinking, ^{is,} will the other side surrender or not?

Maybe ^{he} will, maybe ^{he} won't. But They will certainly be thinking, ^{will he} what do we do next ~~HE~~ and at which point will it make HIM pay to decide. ^{I must} Close my eyes, hold my ears, and press the button because the alternative is ^{to} suffer his first strike.

Q: Does the Existence of the hotline enter the scenario in any way?

D-E: It could, but the - it's a possibility. The question is what you're prepared to say over the hot line. What ~~you~~ are you going to communicate?

Q: You might make a deal.

Yes, you could make a deal and that would ^{mean then} be backing down. But I'm postulating ~~the~~ ⁱⁿ the situation now which is - I'm not saying that's the way it has to go. I'm not describing ^a the situation ^{which is certain to arise, but rather} where - one that could arise, and it's one ^{sense} where the ~~IX~~ situation has gotten in a certain, to a certain level. We use, desperately and hopefully, small nuclear weapons using the hot line, making a deal - ^{we} use the hot line ^{(almost surely we would do that) - we would use the} - here's what we're doing - we are not doing any ^{hotline} ^{say} more - we are not demanding this or that - we only want to stop this. ^{We would certainly minimize our demands, to maximize the...} We're not ~~at war~~, ^{on alert} and so forth. ~~IX~~ Let me postulate that whoever is on the other end of that hot line ^{my} says: you just made a serious mistake, the situation is out of ~~our~~ ^{my} control. You're asking me to do something. You don't want me to reply ^{to these weapons?} - Well let me tell you, you made a mistake, I have to reply. ^{or you don't get any answer.} What I'm saying, let me postulate one further step. The message fails, the Russians do send back a few nuclear weapons. Now we go on from there. All I'm saying is at that point under current situation, neither side would be saying let's wait and see what the other will do because we certainly have no advantage in going first. You can guarantee that under current situation ^{that} both sides will be at least considering the possible desirability ^{of} in going first in a desperate situation. What makes the thing credible is that all of a sudden they will not be comparing the consequences of going first to the consequences

of losing this confrontation. Losing the confrontation will always look better to them. I'm saying they are comparing - so they would never go first. They are now comparing it to a much less stringent criterium, going first, versus going second. That ^{does} ~~is~~ not required that you come out well. It doesn't even require, to do it, that you will come out better than catastrophic, it just requires that you have to believe that ~~XX~~ there are levels of catastrophe and castastrophe associated with going first is better than the catastrophe ~~and~~ of going second. ~~XXXXXX~~ There will be military men who do see that, ^{difference}

Missing

^{Nyc?} sense., particularly declaratory policy, ^{a lot of what you say makes sense, in the sense that it serves} ~~served~~ in the Air Force, ^{to have the Russian brown} When you get to the actual implementation through your model, ^{these} two pre-empts, you say that it's not impossible that they ^{are 2 things. 1: L.O.W. If you have 2} L.O.W or L-U-Attack. I have to be able to limit that by doing something other than striking a few. They hit the carriers and they are vulnerable and they are not part of the U.S. home. and they get on the hot line and say tit for tat. Strike out homeland, ^{Then if they say, "We're now going to strike your homeland, we'll strike your."} I think there's a lot in what you're saying

^{The other thing:} I think there is a lot to what you're saying, but w/out addressing only empty holes. Let me postulate that what is happening. In my model, I postulate that in

^{D-} era when no other basis, than what I'm about to describe, for credible first escalation is available ^{no better basis is available -} and the first-use threats are thought to be, at least by us, indispensable at some low level...

objectively, I don't see how the model works.